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BARBARA BLACK∗
INTRODUCTION
Nearly everyone wishing to invest in the securities markets must use the
services of brokerage firms out of necessity. Even investors who select their own
investments require brokerage services to execute their transactions. Other investors
place greater reliance on their brokers and look to them to provide investment
advice. Many brokerage houses, particularly large full-service firms, distinguish their
services from discount brokers by encouraging customers to rely on their advice.
Such companies advertise heavily to promote both their investment acumen and
their attention to customers’ needs.1 Because incompetent or careless brokers can
cause tremendous harm to their customers’ financial well-being, often with grave
implications for their retirement security, customers who are encouraged to rely on
information provided by their brokers are entitled to expect that brokers will
perform these services competently and carefully.
The principal participants in the regulation of the brokerage industry agree
that broker competence and care are central to the federal regulatory system. When
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“SEA”), it recognized2 that
public confidence in the U.S. capital markets depends on competent and careful
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1

2 As expressed by a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) who was a
staff attorney in its Enforcement Division for many years, “[I]t is clear that, in enacting the securities
laws, Congress intended to raise the standards of conduct of those playing important roles in the
securities markets . . . .” Manuel F. Cohen & Joel J. Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The
Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 691, 694
(1964).
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securities salespersons.3 Moreover, the need for professionalism in the selling of
securities is a consistent theme in subsequent amendments to the SEA: in 1964,4
Congress strengthened qualification standards for broker-dealers;5 in 1975, it adopted
major reforms to the self-regulatory system to better “police the conduct and
strengthen the professional standards of professional participants in [the United
States] securities markets;”6 in 1990, it added provisions to curb brokers’ sales
practices in penny stocks, a segment of the market particularly rife with abuses.7 The
U.S. Supreme Court has frequently stated that one of the purposes of the federal
securities laws is achieving “a high standard of business ethics in the securities
3 The brokerage firm’s salespersons are technically “associated persons” as defined in Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (2006). However, they are more colloquially
referred to as brokers.

In 1961, Congress directed the SEC to conduct a study and report on the adequacy of the rules of
the Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”) for the protection of investors, including disciplinary
rules for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2006). The SEC’s final product, the Special Study of the
Securities Markets, led to the 1964 amendments to the SEA that subjected non-exchange brokerdealers to additional regulation: all broker-dealers in the over-the-counter markets (“OTC”) would be
subject to standards of “training, experience, competence, and such other qualifications as the
Commission finds necessary.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7)
(2006). Broker-dealers that were regulated only by the SEC (“SECO”) would be subject to SEC rules
designed “to promote just and equitable principles of trade.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2006). In 1983, Congress required all OTC broker-dealers to
belong to a national securities association, thus eliminating SECO broker-dealers. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2006).
4

5 The House of Representatives observed “a dramatic increase in public participation in the securities
markets, particularly among persons having but slight acquaintance with the intricacies of corporate
finance and stock market operations. This development demands that the selling of securities be
conducted in a more professional manner . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 1778, at 3 (1962), reprinted in 2
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 1759, 1761 (1983).

H. R. REP. NO. 94-123, at 44 (1975), reprinted in 3 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1933-1982, at 2471, 2514 (1983). Specifically, the rules of national securities exchanges, the
SEC (with respect to SECO broker-dealers), and national securities associations were required to
promote “just and equitable principles of trade,” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(b)(5) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2006); see
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(9), and standards with respect to “training, experience, and
competence.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(c)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(3)(A) (2006);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 15A(g)(3)(A) & (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(3)(A) & (B) (2006).
6

7 See generally Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (regulating the penny stock market).
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industry.”8 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in turn, identified
competence and care as important components of ethical conduct through its
development of the “shingle theory,” which holds brokerage firms to an implied
representation that they will deal fairly and competently with their customers.9 The
principal Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”)10 charged with the front-line
responsibility of regulating the brokerage industry, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), have
enacted rules that include standards of competence and emphasize “commercial
honor” and “just and equitable principles of trade”11 for the protection of investors.
In short, they all would agree with the statement, made over forty years ago, that
“[n]o amount of disclosure . . . can be effective to protect investors unless the
securities are sold by a salesman who understands and appreciates both the nature of
the securities he sells and his responsibilities to the investor to whom he sells.”12
Unfortunately, these views are largely rhetoric. In reality, many customers
are victims of negligent treatment by their brokers. The SEC reports that it receives
more complaints about broker-dealers than any other type of entity,13 and customers
who file arbitration claims against their brokers14 classify a significant number of

8 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002);
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979).
9

See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961).

10 “Self-regulatory organization” is defined at Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(26) (2006).

NYSE CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (2003); NASD BY-LAWS art. XI, § 1 (2006), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000026.
11

See H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 1, at 588 (1963). The omitted language refers to a prospectus, but the
point is the same with respect to trading transactions.

12

Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A View from Inside the SEC: Remarks
at the Financial Service Institute’s 2006 Broker-Dealer Conference (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch012506cag.htm [hereinafter Glassman].
13

In Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Supreme Court permitted
arbitration of SEA claims pursuant to arbitration clauses in customers’ agreements with their brokers.
Id. at 238. Since this holding, virtually all disputes between individual investors and their brokers go
to arbitration before NASD or NYSE arbitration forums.

14
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these claims as negligence.15 As just one example of widespread negligence resulting
in customers’ losses, in 2004, fifteen firms settled with the SEC and NASD for their
salespersons’ failure to obtain discounts on mutual fund fees that customers were
entitled to because of the amount of their purchases.16
A fundamental deficiency in the current federal regulatory system, as
interpreted by the federal courts, is that customers have no federal remedy for
injuries caused by the investment advice of incompetent and careless salespersons.
The lofty language of Congress and the Supreme Court17 masks the reality that, since
1933, Congress has been stingy in creating private remedies for investors18 and that
in recent years, the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of investors’ remedies,
doubting their deterrence value and expressing concern about their costs.19 Section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“SA”)20 is the only express private damages
remedy for negligent advice; however, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,21 the Supreme Court
held that this provision did not apply to trading transactions.22 In Ernst & Ernst v.
These
statistics
are
available
http://www.nasd.com/ArbitrationMediation/NASDDisputeResolution/statistics/index.htm.
15

16

at

Glassman, supra note 13.

17 The Supreme Court uses the aspirational language set forth supra in the text accompanying note 8
only when the government is enforcing the federal securities laws, not when private parties seek to
enforce them.

Congress has added only one explicit remedy since the original enactments of the SA and SEA, in
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1988. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and
Insider Trading in the 1980s, EXPRESSO PREPRINT SERIES, Working Paper 941, Feb. 8, 2006, available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/941 (analyzing why Congress devoted so much attention to
increasing the penalties for insider trading). In 1990, Congress amended Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) to allow purchasers of penny stocks to rescind purchases made in
violation of the cold-calling rules. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. In 2002, as part of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress extended the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658(b) (2006).
18

The best example is Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1977), where the Court
asserted that Rule 10b-5 litigation poses a greater danger of vexatiousness than other types of
litigation. Id. at 741.

19

20

15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006).

21

513 U.S. 561 (1995).

22

Id. at 582.
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Hochfelder,23 the Court limited the implied remedy under SEA section 10(b) 24 and
Rule 10b-525 to exclude negligence actions.26 While the Supreme Court held that SA
sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)27 apply to negligent advice in trading transactions,28 the
federal courts of appeal currently assume that the Court would not recognize an
implied cause of action under this provision.29 Similarly, federal courts do not
recognize the SEC’s shingle theory outside of SEC enforcement actions30 and have
refused to imply private causes of action for breach of NYSE and NASD rules.31
23

425 U.S. 185 (1976).

24

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).

25

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).

26

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214.

27

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) & (3) (2006).

In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Supreme Court held that SA sections 17(a)(2) and
17(a)(3) do not require scienter. Id. at 702. In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the
Supreme Court held that SA section 17(a) applies to “ordinary market trading.” Id. at 778.
28

See, e.g., Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998), discussed infra notes 105-108 and
accompanying text. But see AFA Private Equity Fund 1 v. Miresco Inv. Servs., No. 02-74650, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22071, at *14-15 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005) (following Sixth Circuit precedent to
the contrary).
29

30 See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); Roebuck v. Guttman, 678 F. Supp. 68, 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Graphic Enters., Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335, 342 n. 12 (D.
Minn. 1971); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271,
1296-97 (1995) (concluding that private plaintiffs cannot recover damages under the shingle theory).
31 Since the Supreme Court’s retrenchment from implying causes of action, appellate courts are
instead focusing on legislative intent and finding it lacking. See, e.g., Spicer v. Chicago Bd. of Options
Exchs., 977 F.2d. 255, 266 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining to announce a categorical rule, but looking to
legislative intent to find no implied cause of action under the CBOE trading rules); Jablon v. Dean
Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679-81 (9th Cir. 1980). Previously, courts had been more favorably
disposed to imply a cause of action in some circumstances, although they expressed reluctance to
impose liability for negligence. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410
F.2d 135, 143 (7th Cir. 1969) (noting that plaintiffs alleged fraud); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache &
Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966). In contrast, commentators at that time generally supported
imposing liability on brokers for negligent violations of those SRO rules intended to protect investors
(as opposed to “housekeeping rules”). See, e.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based upon Stock
Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12, 30 (1966); Lewis D. Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-theCounter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 633, 643 (1966);
Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock
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Some federal courts have even said that brokers owe no duty of care to their
customers.32
What accounts for this discrepancy between rhetoric and reality? The late
Professor Louis Loss, who was present at the creation of the federal securities laws,
thought it “almost inconceivable” that Congress failed to provide a remedy for the
vast majority of investors who purchase securities in trading transactions.33 Many
commentators agree with Professor Loss and cogently argue that the Supreme Court
simply got it wrong in Gustafson.34 An equally plausible explanation, however, is that
Congress made a deliberate policy decision that SEC and SRO regulation would
adequately protect investors from incompetent and careless brokers; this viewpoint is
supported by consistent Congressional action to strengthen the responsibilities and
authority of the SROs35 and to add private remedies only for more egregious forms
of broker misconduct.36 More cynically, Congressional failure to provide investors
with a private damages remedy for negligent advice may reflect the securities
industry’s extensive lobbying efforts and political clout.37
Whatever the explanation, the reality for many customers who are victims of
their broker’s negligence is that their losses may go uncompensated. In the absence
of a federal remedy, customers are forced to fashion a remedy from state law
Exchange Rules, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1120, 1141-42 (1970). But see Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., A Stock Broker’s
Implied Liability to its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV.
253, 272 (1970) (arguing that “protection of investors” means protection of the general public and not
the individual investor, “who very often profits from and participates in the rule violation”).
See, e.g, Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Lau, 693 F. Supp. 1445, 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(stating that since there is no duty of care for securities brokers, there certainly is not one for
commodities brokers).
32

33

Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908, 916 (1992).

See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. LAW.
1231, 1251 (1995); Ted J. Fiflis, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.: Judicial vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEC. REG.
L. J. 423 (1996); Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 95 (1996).
34

35

See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.

36

See supra note 18.

For a former SEC Chairman’s description of the powerful interest groups in the securities industry,
see ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA
DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT YOU CAN DO TO FIGHT BACK 236-239 (2002).
37
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principles cobbled together primarily from tort and agency law. State law, however,
provides inadequate protection for customers for two reasons. First, the choice of
state law can result in significantly different treatment of substantially similar
conduct.38 Second, as explained in Part I of this Article, while tort and agency law
provide a sound basis for imposing liability on negligent brokers, state courts
generally have been reluctant to do so and instead take a narrow view of the duty the
broker owes to his customer.39 Thus, reliance on state law is anomalous with the
important federal principle of the centrality of broker competence and care to well
operating national capital markets.
This Article argues that Congress should amend the SEA to establish federal
standards of care and competence and to allow customers to sue for damages when
these standards are violated. Part I explains why state law remedies provide
inadequate protection for investors. Part II sets forth the proposed federal
standards. Part III considers, as an alternative to congressional enactment,
promulgation of these standards by the SEC and explores possible ways that
investors could use them as a basis for damages claims. Part IV assesses the policy
objections made by the Supreme Court and other federal courts to expanding private
damages remedies for investors. This Article argues that such objections are
inapplicable or unconvincing in the customer-broker setting, particularly since
virtually all of these claims will be resolved through SRO arbitration. Part V explains
why adoption of these legal standards is important as SRO arbitration moves away
from its origins as an equitable forum toward a quasi-judicial system where investors’
claims may need to be more firmly grounded in legal principles. For these reasons,
this Article concludes that Congress should adopt federal standards of competence
and care and provide an express remedy for broker negligence.
I. THE NECESSITY FOR A FEDERAL REMEDY: THE INADEQUACY OF STATE
LAW PROTECTION
This Section discusses some common forms of broker negligence that harm
investors. Although broker negligence theories may overlap, for the sake of
convenience, Section A divides them into three categories: negligent misstatements,
negligent conduct, and negligent failure to speak. Section B sets forth basic tort and
See, e.g., Williams v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7588, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12121, at
*18-19 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (noting that California law offers greater protection to customers
than New York law).

38

39 See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing
the limited scope of the broker’s legal duties to customers).
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agency law principles, as well as established industry standards, and demonstrates
that together these principles support imposing liability on brokers in all three
situations. Despite this, state courts have been reluctant to impose negligence-based
liability on brokers. Although this judicial reluctance is unwarranted, it is pervasive
and longstanding, as is illustrated in Section C. Thus, the best solution is to amend
the SEA to establish federal standards of competence and care and to provide an
express federal remedy.
A. Broker Negligence
To some degree, all investors are vulnerable to harm from their brokers’
negligence. Even investors who make their own investment decisions rely on their
brokers to execute orders in accordance with their instructions, to obtain the best
available prices and not to enter into unauthorized transactions. Investors expect
their brokers to perform these services competently and can suffer financial harm if
the brokers’ conduct is negligent.
Many investors expect more from their brokers and rely on them to provide
sound investment advice. In turn, many brokers are eager to provide advice and
solicit customers by promoting the quality of their advice. Accordingly, this Article
focuses in particular on the harm brokers can cause through negligent advice. The
degree of customers’ reliance can vary. Customers may seek occasional advice about
which securities to purchase and expect that their brokers will be diligent in
obtaining the information, will have the requisite expertise to assess the information,
and will exercise care in communicating the information to them.40 Instead, brokers
may communicate inaccurate or incomplete information about an investment
product or strategy to customers because they were careless in obtaining the correct
information, they lacked sufficient expertise to understand the information, or they
were careless in communicating the information accurately. As a result, customers
may make investment choices they otherwise would not have made and may suffer
financial harm because of their brokers’ negligent misrepresentation.
Other customers’ reliance on their brokers’ advice may be a longstanding and
integral aspect of their relationship; the customer may never make an investment
decision without consulting with, and indeed without the recommendation of, the
broker. In these relationships, the customer expects that the broker will only
recommend investment products or strategies that are suitable for the customer’s
financial needs. In egregious cases, the unsuitable recommendation is the result of
the broker’s fraud. More frequently, however, it is the product of the broker’s lack
40

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. e (1977).
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of diligence resulting from failure to ascertain and understand the customer’s
financial situation and objectives, failure to research and comprehend the
recommended investment product or strategy, or failure to communicate the
recommendation to the customer with sufficient care so that the customer
understands the potential benefits and risks of the investment. If the broker’s
recommendations are unsuitable, the customer may experience serious financial
harm. Although unsuitable recommendations may also be considered a type of
misrepresentation, this Article treats them as a form of conduct because of the
specialized nature of the claim, the importance of the broker’s actions in
investigating the recommendation, and the frequency of these claims.
Finally, other investors seek greater assistance from their brokers; they expect
their brokers to construct and manage suitable investment portfolios for them,
including recommending alterations to their portfolios based on changing
conditions. Customers who look to brokers to serve as their financial advisers may
expect their brokers to provide them with information, and, if brokers fail to do so,
they may suffer financial loss. Customers have frequently made two complaints.
First, after the broker persuades the customer to buy an investment product
(typically, stock in a start-up company with growth potential), the broker does not
provide the customer with any updated information about the investment, so that
the customer is caught unawares when its market price drops. Second, if the
customer instructs the broker to purchase an investment product or pursue an
investment strategy that involves greater risk than is suitable for the customer, the
broker does not warn the customer that, in the broker’s professional opinion, the
investment is too risky for the customer. Customers may expect that, because of the
nature of that relationship, brokers have a duty to provide their customers with
information in these two instances.
B. Basic Tort and Agency Law Principles
Negligent Misrepresentations. Leading torts commentators state that common
law liability for negligent misrepresentations exists in commercial relationships where
the resulting injury is pecuniary.41 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
41 Judicial concerns about the potentially broad scope of liability, as expressed in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 (1931), are not present in the customer-broker situation.
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transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.42
In the words of one leading treatise, “there would seem to be very little justification
for not extending liability to all parties and agents to a bargaining transaction for
making misrepresentations negligently.”43
Negligent Conduct. Common law agency and tort principles hold agents
responsible for harm caused to their principals by their failure to live up to industry
standards of care and competence. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, an
agent owes a duty to the principal to act with the standard of care recognized within
the industry, unless the agreement provides otherwise. 44 Similarly, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts requires individuals to exercise the degree of care and skill
“normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in
similar communities.”45 Failure to live up to industry standards is a basis for liability,
unless the parties agreed that the standards were not part of their contract. In
addition, under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the agent has a duty “to use
reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs
entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1971); see, e.g., Maliner v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No.
04-60237-CIV-ALTONAGA/Bandstra, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5985, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2005)
(allowing plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim against portfolio manager). Professor Dobbs’
criticism that section 552 is over-inclusive does not apply to broker-customer relationships, since he is
concerned about imposing liability on adversary bargainers who do not undertake to exercise
reasonable care. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 472 at 1352-53 (2001) [hereinafter 2
DOBBS].
42

43

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 745 (5th ed. 1984).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958); see Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Ross, 557
N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that negligence claims can be based on breach of
industry regulations).

44

45

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
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have.”46 Courts, for example, consistently impose liability on real estate brokers in
negligence for failure to live up to industry standards. 47
Industry Standards of Care and Competence. SRO rules and other recognized
industry standards set forth standards of care and competence applicable to brokers.
With respect to negligent misrepresentations, SRO rules generally require that when
communicating information about an investment product or strategy to a customer,
the broker must exercise care to ensure that the information is correct and that the
broker conveys it accurately to the customer.48 When the broker recommends an
investment product or strategy to the customer, the broker’s responsibilities, and
what constitutes reasonable care, are spelled out in more detail.49 SRO rules make
clear that brokers must have sufficient information about their customers’ financial
situation, including their current holdings and investment objectives,50 as well as
sufficient information about the recommended investment product or strategy,51 so
that their recommendations are suitable for their customers (the “suitability
obligation”).52
Although there are no specific SRO rules addressing the broker’s duty to
update and duty to warn, industry standards recognize both duties. The Content
Outline for the General Securities Registered Representative Examination (Test
Series 7),53 the qualification examination for general securities registered
46

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).

See, e.g., Saiz v. Horn, 668 N.W.2d 332, 337 (S.D. 2003); Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 471
(Iowa 1985).

47

48 See NYSE Rules and Constitution, Rule 472(i) (2006); NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule 2110
(2006); NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule IM-2310.2 (2006).
49

NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule 2310 (2006); NYSE Rules and Constitution, Rule 405 (2006).

50

NASD Manual Conduct Rules, Rule 2310 (2006).

51 Churning (excessive trading done for the purpose of generating commission income) is an example
of an unsuitable trading strategy. See Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 767 F.2d
1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing churning as a Rule 10b-5 violation where there is scienter).
52 See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 601 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing unsuitability
claim as a Rule 10b-5 violation where there is scienter).

The Content Outline is available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/series7.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
2006) [hereinafter Content Outline].

53
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representatives, 54 identifies monitoring the customer’s account and making ongoing
recommendations as one of the broker’s “critical functions and tasks.”55 In addition,
industry standards recognize that a broker has a duty to warn if a customer is about
to engage in investment activity that the broker deems excessively risky. While the
Content Outline does not specifically use the verb “warn,” several general
descriptions fairly encompass this duty: “[a]ssist[ing] the customer in determining
investment needs and objectives”56 and “[e]xplain[ing] how the risks and rewards of a
particular investment or investment strategy relate to the customer’s financial needs
and investment objectives.”57 Brokerage firms’ compliance manuals frequently state
54
The Series 7 examination is the entry-level examination for registered representatives. It is
developed, maintained and owned by the NYSE and is administered and scored by NASD. It is
intended “to safeguard the investing public by helping to ensure that registered representatives are
competent to perform their jobs” and “seeks to measure accurately and reliably the degree to which
each candidate possesses the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform the critical functions of
a registered representative.” Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Notice
of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto
Relating to Increasing Certain Fees Charged by the Exchange to its Members and Member
Organizations, Rel. No. 34-53235, 2006 WL 1595655, at *2 (Feb. 6, 2006). For background on the
development of the Series 7 examination, see Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule
Change Relating to Amendments to the Examination Specifications and Content Outline for the
General Securities Registered Representative (Series 7) Examination, Rel. 34-35401, 60 F.R. 10886
(Feb. 28, 1995).
55 This is one of seven identified “critical functions.” See Content Outline, supra note 53, at 3-4.
Specifically, registered representatives must

[1] Routinely review[ ] the customer’s account to ensure that investments continue
to be suitable.
[2] Suggest[ ] to the customer which securities to acquire, liquidate, hold, or hedge.
[3] Explain[ ] how news about an issuer’s financial outlook may affect the
performance of that issuer’s securities.
[4] Determine[ ] which sources would best answer a customer’s questions
concerning investments and use[] information from appropriate sources to provide
the customer with relevant information.
[5] Keep[ ] the customer informed about the customer’s investments.
Id. at 3.
This is an aspect of the critical function of “[e]valuates customers in terms of financial needs,
current holdings, and available investment capital, and helps them identify their investment
objectives.” Id.

56

57 This is an aspect of the critical function of “[p]rovides customers and prospective customers with
information on investments and makes suitable recommendations.” Id. The language quoted in the
text is not limited to investments or strategies recommended by the broker. Id.
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that warning customers of risks they may not adequately understand is part of
brokers’ responsibilities to their customers.58 A well-known study guide for the
Series 7 examination states that “[o]ccasionally, a customer asks a registered rep to
enter a trade that the rep believes is unsuitable. It is the rep's responsibility to explain
why the trade might not be appropriate for the customer.”59
To recap: (1) Tort and agency principles establish that agents can be held
liable for failure to live up to established industry standards of care and competence;
and (2) SRO rules and other industry standards relating to advice-giving are wellestablished. Thus, it would seem a foregone conclusion that courts would impose
negligence-based liability on brokers when their failure to adhere to these standards
results in financial harm to their customers. As this Article will demonstrate,
however, courts have been reluctant to impose negligence-based liability on brokers.
C. Judicial Decisions
Courts generally recognize that customers may sue their brokers for negligent
misrepresentations,60 although some courts have cabined the theory with limiting
doctrines. Courts have not allowed negligent misrepresentations claims against
brokers where “sophisticated equals” negotiated at arms-length61 or where the broker
was acting as the agent for the seller of the investment product.62 These limitations
illustrate a general disinclination to impose liability for negligent misrepresentations
unless the court believes that the defendant owed a special responsibility to the

58 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and Risk in Securities Law, 64
U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 501-02 (2003) [hereinafter Black & Gross].
59

Id. (quoting PASSTRAK SERIES 7: GENERAL SECURITIES REPRESENTATIVES 670 (11th ed. 2000)).

See, e.g., Zurad v. Lehman Bros., 757 F.2d 129, 134 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that broker violated
duty of reasonable care in obtaining and relaying information when he advised customer to purchase
securities without supplying information about the stock’s volatility); Cont’l Leavitt Commc’ns, Ltd. v.
PaineWebber, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting that defendant held itself out as
providing information and advice to customers); Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 794 P.2d 1015,
1016-17 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing the statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation
claims).
60

See Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1061 (D. Minn. 2003); see also Crigger v.
Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding no fraud liability where the customers
were sophisticated).
61

62

See Zahorik v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 309, 314 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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person to whom he was communicating the information.63 New York courts, for
example, require this “special relationship” because otherwise liability would attach
to “casual response[s] given informally” in commercial relationships that do not
warrant justifiable reliance.64 Thus, liability will be imposed only on those persons
who possess unique or specialized expertise or who are in a special position of
confidence or trust with the injured party.65
Even under the restrictive view, the customer-broker relationship establishes
the requisite “special relationship” since the broker solicits the customer’s business
on the basis of the broker’s expertise and the customer seeks the broker’s advice for
precisely that reason.66 Indeed, in providing advice and information, the broker
fosters a non-adversarial relationship with his customers for the very purpose of
encouraging the customer’s reliance on his expertise and use of his services. Thus,
the broker should not be encouraged to make the kind of casual uninformed
responses that may be countenanced from used car salesmen. There is some case
support for this view; for example, New York, a state that is not generally receptive
to customers’ claims, has recognized that a special relationship is present when a
broker-dealer provides information about securities to its customers when soliciting
their business.67
In contrast to real estate brokers,68 courts are reluctant to impose negligence
liability on securities brokers for failure to adhere to industry standards. The
Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, held that state regulations requiring brokers
to have reasonable grounds for making recommendations to customers did not

See 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, § 472, at 1349; 2 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S.
GRAY, HARPER, JAMES, AND GRAY ON TORTS § 7.6 at 476-77 (2006).
63

64 See Kimmell v. Schaefer, 675 N.E.2d 450, 454 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Heard v. City of New York, 623
N.E.2d 541, 546 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993)).

Id. Expertise alone, however, may not be enough. See Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp.
1421, 1431 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressing unwillingness to hold that “in every case wherein someone
with expertise is hired a fiduciary relationship is created”).
65

66

See 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, § 469, at 1350.

67

See In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216, 284-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).

68

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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provide a basis for a customer’s negligence claim.69 Similarly, courts have refused to
hold a broker liable for failing to monitor the account unless the broker has
discretion or otherwise controls the customer’s account.70 There is, however, some
case law support for recognition of a duty to warn. Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.,71 frequently cited for the proposition that the broker owes the
customer only a limited duty, acknowledges that a broker could have a “duty to
inform the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling a particular
security,”72 the extent of this duty depending on the customer’s experience and
intelligence. A few other cases extend this duty to warning about investment
strategies, where there is a relationship between the broker and the unsophisticated
customer that justifies the customer’s reliance on the broker’s supposed expertise.73
Courts do not provide extensive analysis or compelling justifications for their
reluctance to hold brokers responsible for their failure to meet industry standards.
Courts frequently assert a narrow view of the duties that brokers owe their
customers and, in particular, assert that brokers owe their customers no ongoing
duty of care.74 Rather, courts view the broker’s duty as transaction-specific, limited
to the execution of the customer’s orders in accordance with his instructions and
completed upon execution.75 The only exceptions the courts recognize involve
69 Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Minn. 1994); see
also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1291 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (declining
to apply section 299A to a broker-dealer).

See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002);
Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 777 F. Supp. 153, 159 (D. P.R.
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 993 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1993); Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman
Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1985). For further discussion of the cases, see
Black & Gross, supra note 58, at 504-05.

70

71

461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978).

72

Id. at 953.

73 See, e.g., Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049-50 (11th Cir. 1987);
Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So.2d 942, 948-52 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
74 See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1306. In contrast, investment advisers are treated as having a
fiduciary relationship with the investor. See, e,g,, Capital Dist. Physician’s Health Plan v. O’Higgins,
939 F. Supp. 992, 1001-1003 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
75

See Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 952-53.
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situations where the broker has control over the account.76 Under this narrow view,
even when the broker recommends the purchase of a particular security and the
customer acts on the recommendation, the broker has no duty to advise the
customer about developments that make it inadvisable for the customer to continue
to hold the security. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion is a typical example,
reciting this narrow view of the broker’s duty and then stating that brokers are not
“guarantor[s] or insurer[s]” against customers’ losses.77 The latter statement is a non
sequitur, since the customer is not asserting that the broker made any guarantee of
results nor is he seeking recovery for unanticipated losses. Rather, the customer
seeks recovery for losses attributable to the broker’s negligence. Some courts state
that, to impose liability on the broker, there must be evidence that the broker made a
commitment to observe the standards and that the customer relied on this
commitment.78 This approach is exactly the opposite of the Restatement (Second) of
Tort’s approach, which holds the broker to the industry standard unless the parties
contract otherwise.79 Other courts have stated that internal firm rules are for the
benefit of the firm;80 others are disinclined to impose liability on firms that have
adopted higher standards.81 These courts apparently believe that when the broker
fails to live up to these standards, the disappointed customer should take those
losses as a learning experience and find a better broker.
Judicial reluctance to hold brokers to well-established industry standards is
inexplicable: since these standards are for the protection of investors, customers can
reasonably expect their brokers to live up to them. This judicial reluctance, however,
is pervasive and longstanding; thus, the best solution is to amend the SEA to
establish federal standards of competence and care and to provide expressly for a
federal remedy. Legislative consideration of this proposal would at least engender a

76 Most instances of control are created by contract, where the customer gives his broker discretionary
power over the account, although courts sometimes recognize de facto control, as where the broker
dominates a particularly vulnerable customer. See Black & Gross, supra note 58, at 488.
77

Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Minn. 1994).

78

See, e.g., Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., Inc., 808 F.2d 1384, 1387 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987).

79

See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.

80

See, e.g., J.E. Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, 572 F. Supp. 814, 822 (E.D. Mich. 1983).

81 See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1311 (2d Cir. 2002); J.E.
Hoetger, 572 F. Supp. at 822.
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robust public debate over what customers can reasonably expect from their brokers.
Part II sets forth proposed federal standards.
II. AMENDING THE SEA TO ESTABLISH FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
COMPETENCE AND CARE AND A FEDERAL REMEDY
This Article proposes that federal standards include four minimum standards
of care that brokers owe to all their customers. These proposed standards are based
on SRO rules, industry standards, and common law tort and agency principles. They
may be stated as follows: (1) the broker must obey the customer’s instructions and
must not make decisions pertaining to the account unless authorized by the
customer to do so;82 (2) when executing transactions on behalf of a customer, the
broker must obtain the best available price (the “duty of best execution”);83 (3) when
communicating information about an investment product or strategy to a customer,
the broker must exercise care to ensure that the information is correct and that the
broker conveys it accurately;84 and (4) when making recommendations (or purchases
in a discretionary account), the broker must have sufficient information about both
the customer’s financial situation, including current holdings and investment
objectives, and the recommended (or purchased) investment product, to ensure that
the recommendations (or purchases) are suitable for the customer (the “suitability
obligation”). This suitability obligation also extends to trading strategies.85 Because
these four standards are minimum standards that apply to all customer-broker
relationships, the broker should not be able to disclaim his responsibility to adhere to
these standards.
Two additional standards should be applicable when the customer relies on
the broker to provide financial advice. These duties, based on well-recognized
industry standards, may be stated as follows: (5) the broker has a duty to monitor the
customer’s account and to make ongoing recommendations about the customer’s
portfolio based on changes in the portfolio, the market, or the customer’s financial
situation;86 and (6) the broker owes a duty to warn the customer when securities or
Brokers, as agents, must obey the customer’s instructions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
AGENCY § 385 (1958).
82

83

See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1998).

84

See supra notes 41-43, 48 and accompanying text.

85

See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.

86

See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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strategies the customer decides on his own to pursue entail greater risks than he
should assume.87 Many customers make their own investment decisions and select
their brokers for reasons unrelated to the quality of the investment advice; thus,
brokers and customers should have the freedom to agree that these two standards do
not apply to their relationship. Accordingly, the broker’s contract with the customer
may explicitly state that the broker does not undertake any responsibilities to oversee
the customer’s account. Because it is important for customers to understand that
they cannot expect such services from their brokers, this provision should be written
in plain English, in bold-face type, and require a separate acknowledgement from the
customer, such as initialing.
Finally, customers of those securities firms that hold themselves out as
financial advisors and heavily advertise their stock-picking prowess may reasonably
expect their brokers to meet industry performance standards. Brokers could be
rated, just as mutual funds are, according to their performance relative to market
benchmarks. Under this view, selecting suitable investments is a minimum
requirement; among a choice of suitable investments, some will outperform others.
The brokerage firm or individual broker that promotes superior stock-picking
abilities could be held to (7) a duty of professional competence, just as investment
advisers are.88 Reluctance to propose this as a legally enforceable standard, however,
stems from the lack of well-developed legal standards for determining professional
competence for stockbrokers. Moreover, there is a reasonable argument that the
broker should not be liable to the customer so long as the recommended
investments are suitable. Whether the broker has constructed the optimal
investment portfolio for the customer involves financial planning considerations that
well may be inappropriate for determination by a judge or arbitration panel. If the
customer is dissatisfied with the performance of his portfolio, the best solution may
be to find another broker. Therefore, adoption of this standard may not be
advisable. However, in instances where brokers advertise their stock-picking
prowess, judges and arbitrators may reasonably take this into consideration in
determining the broker’s liability to the customer.

87

See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.

88 See Erlich v. First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 234-35 (N.J. Super. 1984) (holding that a
bank offering professional investment advisory services should be held to the standard of care for
professional investment advisers); Alton v. Wyland, 595 N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that one who holds himself out as an investment advisor is liable as such). Some states,
however, do not allow professional malpractice claims against financial advisers because they are not
“professionals” under state licensing requirements. See, e.g., Maliner v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 0460237-CIV-ALTONAGA/Bandstra, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5985, at *24 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2005).
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III. A SECOND-BEST APPROACH
While the best solution is amending the SEA as described above, it is unlikely
that Congress would adopt such legislation. The securities industry is sure to oppose
it and to finance lobbying efforts against it. Moreover, history shows that
amendments to provide investors with additional remedies are rare.89 Accordingly,
this Part argues that the SEC should promulgate rules establishing the previously
described federal standards of competence and care for brokers. Since there also
needs to be a remedy for customers who suffer losses because of their brokers’
negligent violation of these standards, this article explores ways to accomplish this.
A. SEC’s vs. SROs’ Authority
The SEC has the authority to adopt federal standards of competence and
care. SEA section 15(b)(7) authorizes the SEC to establish standards of “training,
experience, competence, and such other qualifications” as the SEC finds necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.90 In addition, the
SEC has the authority, under SEA section 15(c)(2)(D), to regulate negligent conduct
by brokers in the OTC market that harms investors.91 Under the latter authority, the
SEC has defined fraud broadly92 to include misrepresentations made with reasonable
grounds to believe they are untrue.93
The SEC has generally preferred, however, to delegate the responsibility for
establishing standards and regulating sales practices,94 including the creation and the
administration of the qualifying examinations, to the SROs.95 Similarly, the SEC has

89

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

90

15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (2006).

The provision gives the SEC the authority to adopt rules that “prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent” fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)(D) (2006).

91

92 Fraud includes “any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2(a) (2006).
93

17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2(b) (2006).

94

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (2006).

95

See supra note 54.
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adopted only a few rules regulating sales practices, and those it has adopted relate to
abusive, not negligent, conduct 96
Due to the national importance of industry standards, the SEC should no
longer delegate the responsibility of promulgating these standards to the SROs or the
industry. Instead, as the agency entrusted with investor protection, the SEC should
assume responsibility for establishing the proposed federal standards of competence
and care. Elevation of these principles to SEC rules should send a signal to the
industry that the SEC treats brokers’ duties of competence and care seriously. In
addition, a SEC rule-making proposal would provide a salutary opportunity for
debate about what customers can reasonably expect from their brokers and would
reaffirm the importance of competent and careful brokers. The SEC rules should
explicitly state that investors are the intended beneficiaries of these standards.
B. Enforcement of these Standards
If the SEC promulgates these standards and states that investors are the
intended beneficiaries, the next issue is how customers injured by their brokers’
failure to adhere to these standards could obtain redress.
Virtually all customers’ claims against their brokers are arbitrated in SROsponsored arbitration forums. There is a debate about whether arbitrators must
apply the law in deciding these claims.97 Traditionally, arbitration has been viewed as
an equitable forum where arbitrators are not bound by strictures of legal doctrine;98

96 Rule 15c1-7 prohibits churning in discretionary accounts. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-7 (2006). Rules
15g-1 through 15g-9 regulate sales practices for penny stocks. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15g-1 to g-9 (2006).
97 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 995-98 (2002).
98 The following frequently quoted language, attributed to Domke on Aristotle, captures the concept:
“Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is equitable to prefer arbitration to the
law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and the
reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail.” SECURITIES INDUSTRY
CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR’S MANUAL unnumbered preface page (May 2005),
available
at
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med_arb/documents/mediation_arbitration/nasdw_009668.pdf
[hereinafter ARBITRATOR’S MANUAL].
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however, this view may be changing as, increasingly, the SRO arbitration process is
becoming a more formal and quasi-judicial process.99
Currently, both NASD and the courts take a middle-of-the-road approach.
Thus, NASD provides arbitrators the following guidance:
Arbitrators are not strictly bound by case precedent or statutory law.
Rather, they are guided in their analysis by the underlying policies of
the law and are given wide latitude in their interpretation of legal
concepts. On the other hand, if an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law, an
award may be vacated.100
The Supreme Court announced the “manifest disregard” standard in Wilko v. Swan,101
but has never explained when arbitrators’ deviation from the law becomes so great as
to constitute “manifest disregard.” Due to this lack of clarity, the federal appellate
courts have adopted different versions of the standard.102 For purposes of this
Article, it is sufficient to note that courts recognize limitations on the arbitrators’
powers to award damages to customers in the absence of a legal basis for the award.
If Congress provided an explicit remedy, as proposed in Part II, arbitrators
unquestionably would have the power to award damages to customers. Under the
second-best approach, there must be a source of law that arbitrators can look to in
providing a remedy to customers for breach of the standards. The following
sections, therefore, address the likelihood that courts would recognize remedies, but
it is important to keep in mind that these issues are likely to be resolved in
arbitration. Thus, investors’ attorneys must be able to marshal sufficient legal
The best example of this is a pending rule change by NASD Dispute Resolution to require
arbitrators to provide reasons for awards upon the customers’ request. Self-Regulatory Organizations;
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto, to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards Upon the
Request of Customers, or of Associated Persons in Industry Controversies, SEC Rel. 34-52009 (July
11, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-52009.pdf [hereinafter The Reasoned
Awards Proposed Rule Change].
99

100

ARBITRATOR’S MANUAL, supra note 98, at 29 (emphasis added).

346 U.S. 427 (1953). Wilko’s holding that arbitration agreements were unenforceable with respect
to SA claims was overruled in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989), but the manifest disregard standard for vacatur survived. Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities
Arbitration Today: Why do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 434 (2003).
101

102

See id. at 434-38.
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precedent to ensure that an award of damages based on breach of the standards
would not be susceptible to vacatur on the ground it is in manifest disregard of either
federal or state law. There are three possible sources of law: SA section 17(a), SEA
section 29(b), and state law.
SA Section 17(a).103 As noted above,104 the current assumption among the
federal appellate courts is that the Supreme Court would not imply a private cause of
action under SA section 17(a). Is there any possibility of revisiting this issue?
Maldonado v. Dominguez105 illustrates the judicial reasoning. The court began its
analysis with Hochfelder106 and the Supreme Court’s concern that without a
requirement of scienter, plaintiffs could use the implied Rule 10b-5 remedy to bypass
the procedural obstacles of an express negligence remedy.107 It then generalized
Hochfelder’s holding to require scienter for any implied cause of action under the
securities laws if there is already an express remedy addressing much of the same
conduct and benefiting the same parties.108 The court apparently did not attach any
significance to the fact that, after Gustafson,109 there is no explicit remedy for negligent
trading advice by brokers.
Victims of negligent trading advice, therefore, can argue that the specific
concern addressed in Hochfelder is not present. Additionally, given the strong federal
interest in protecting investors from incompetent and careless brokers, as expressed
by the SEC in adopting these standards, the Court would imply a private cause of
action under SA section 17(a). Unfortunately, however, this argument distinguishing
Hochfelder ultimately may not be convincing, since the absence of an express cause of
action for negligent advice in trading transactions may be seen as strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to provide a remedy for this type of broker misconduct.
In this view, Congress, in 1933 and 1934, was primarily concerned about grosser

103

15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000).

104

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

105

137 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998).

106

See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.

107

Maldonado, 137 F.3d at 7.

108

Id.

109

See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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forms of broker misconduct, such as fraud and manipulation,110 and, in subsequent
amendments, it remained focused on conduct that was bad, not just careless.111
Unless the Supreme Court does an about-face and either determines that Gustafson
was wrongly decided or moves away from its almost exclusive focus on legislative
intent, it is unlikely to accept policy arguments for implying a cause of action under
SA section 17(a).
SEA Section 29(b). The most overlooked explicit remedy in federal securities
laws is SEA section 29(b).112 It invalidates “every contract” made in violation of any
SEA provision or any of its rules and regulations, and “every contract,” “the
performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuation of any
relationship or practice in violation of,” any SEA provision or any of its rules and
regulations.113 In 1990, Congress expanded the section’s coverage to ensure that
customers could void transactions if brokers solicited purchases of penny stocks in
violation of the SEC’s penny stock cold calling rules, as well as other SEC rules.114 If
the SEC adopted federal standards of competence and care, could a customer assert
a claim for rescission and restitution115 under SEA section 29(b) if the broker, in the
course of performing his contract with the customer, violates any of these
provisions?

For a thorough examination of the Supreme Court’s view toward implying causes of action in
1934, see Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction for Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions: The Emperor Has
No Clothes, 49 OHIO STATE L.J. 559, 571-76 (1988). She concludes that particularly where the statute
was viewed as comprehensive, courts viewed the express causes of action as exclusive. Id.
110

111

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

The first, and still the most comprehensive, scholarly examination of this provision is Samuel H.
Gruenbaum & Marc I. Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy
Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Gruenbaum & Steinberg].
112

113

15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (2000).

The amendment “amends Section 29(b) . . . to make voidable securities contracts made in violation
of the Commission’s penny stock cold calling rule and all other rules adopted pursuant to Section
15(c)(2) . . . .” H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1408, 1435. Section
29(b) “gives customers the ability to protect themselves from abusive conduct in the securities
markets by voiding trades that violate the securities laws and rules thereunder.” H.R. REP. No. 101617, at 33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1408, 1409.
114

115 The remedy does not allow for consequential damages. See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note
112, at 24-27.
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There is a paucity of case law interpreting SEA section 29(b), much of it
applying the provision narrowly because of a judicial belief that the remedy is
draconian.116 Some courts hold that only unlawful contracts may be rescinded, not
lawful contracts whose performance involves illegal conduct.117 Other courts draw a
distinction between violations that are inseparable from contract performance and
violations involving conduct that is collateral or tangential to the contract.118 These
narrow interpretations, however, are contrary to the plain meaning of the statute,
particularly after the 1990 amendments,119 and Congress’s precision in carving out
explicit exceptions to its applicability.120 The Supreme Court has consistently stated
that the plain meaning of the statute, as supplemented by the legislative history,
should control in interpreting securities laws;121 policy considerations are relevant
only in fleshing out the contours of the implied remedies.122 Accordingly, if the SEC
adopts these federal standards, customers should be able to avail themselves of SEA
section 29(b) and rescind trades with brokers for violations of these standards.

116 See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255, 1263
(4th Cir. 1974).

See Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing to allow
rescission of trades made to churn the account); Zerman v. Jacobs, 510 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff’d, 672 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1981).

117

118 See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
borrower could not rescind a lending agreement on the ground that the lender violated rule 10b-5 by
its short sales of the borrower’s stock). This distinction was followed in In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig.,
384 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Md. 2005), where late trading and market-timing activities were not a basis to
rescind investment advisory agreements under § 47(b) of the Investment Company Act, which is
similar to § 29(b). Id. at 882-83. But see Beres v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., No. 85 CIV 6674,
1989 WL 105967, at *10-12, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1989) (refusing to dismiss the section 29(b) claim
where Rule 10b-5 violations were alleged).
119

See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.

Thus, Congress provided that a rescission claim could not be brought because of an alleged
violation of any rule prescribed under section 15(c)(3) and gave the SEC the authority to designate
rules adopted under section 15(c)(2) as not triggering rescission under this section.
120

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (stating that “[t]he starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))).
121

“It is . . . proper that we consider . . . what may be described as policy considerations when we
come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment
nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.” Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.

122
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Furthermore, an arbitration award providing this remedy should not be subject to
vacatur for manifest disregard.
State Law Claims. As discussed above,123 although common law tort and
agency principles support imposing liability on brokers for violations of industry
standards, courts have been reluctant to recognize remedies for negligent brokerage
conduct.124 After establishment of these proposed federal standards and the SEC’s
clear statement that customers are the intended beneficiaries of these standards,
arbitration panels should not be reluctant to impose liability on brokers for violations
of these standards under common law tort and agency principles.
Some may question whether this proposal is necessary since, whether or not
there is judicial authority for it, arbitrators may, in fact, be awarding damages to
customers even in the absence of fraud; further, at least to date, unsuccessful parties
do not routinely attempt to vacate awards under the “manifest disregard” standard.125
Thus, arbitrators may be arriving at the right results, even if not strictly
countenanced by the law. However, currently there is a movement to make the SRO
arbitration forums more like courts. NASD is rewriting its arbitration code for
customers’ claims126 and is proposing new rules that transform securities arbitration
into a more judicial process.127 The most significant step in this direction, if adopted,
is the requirement that arbitrators give reasons for their award if the customer
requests them. If arbitrators provide reasons, the award is more susceptible to
judicial scrutiny, since it is virtually impossible to demonstrate that there is manifest
disregard of the law in the absence of an explanation.128 Indeed, while NASD stated
123

See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.

124

See supra notes 60-81 and accompanying text.

125

See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.

Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change and Amendments Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto to Amend NASD Arbitration
Rules for Customer Disputes, SEC Rel. 34-51856 (June 15, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-51855.pdf.

126

See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Provide for a 10-Day Notice Requirement Before a Party Issues a
Subpoena to a Non-Party for Pre-Hearing Discovery; SEC Rel. 34-51981 (Oct. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-51981.pdf; The Reasoned Awards Proposed Rule Change,
supra note 99.
127

128

See Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000).
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that the purpose of the amendment was to increase investors’ confidence in the
process, it noted that the presence of a reasoned award increased the likelihood that
a reviewing court might find grounds to vacate the award.129 In addition, brokerage
firms increasingly are moving to dismiss investors’ claims and moving for summary
judgment on the ground that there is no legal basis for the claim, and courts have
upheld awards that dismiss customers’ claims on such legal grounds. 130 If the SRO
arbitration forums are taking on more aspects of a judicial proceeding, it will become
increasingly important that investors have an unassailable legal basis for their
negligence claims.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS
This Part examines whether there are policy concerns unique to federal
securities laws that might explain judicial reluctance, even prior to Hochfelder and
Gustafson, to impose liability on brokers for negligent conduct. If there are valid
concerns, Congress or the SEC should be wary of providing customers with a new
federal remedy. First, this Part will examine the Supreme Court opinions to
determine the relevance of their articulated policy grounds in the customer-broker
context. Next, this Part will look at lower federal court opinions to assess other
reasons given for the disinclination to hold brokers accountable for their negligence.
The Supreme Court precedent provides limited guidance (1) because it
focuses primarily on the plain meaning of the statute, as supplemented by legislative
intent,131 and, (2) because only two of the Supreme Court’s federal securities opinions
involve suits by a customer against his broker. 132 Nevertheless, even though
Gustafson133 did not involve a customer-broker relationship, the majority opinion did
129

The Reasoned Award Proposed Rule Change, supra note 99, at 4.

130 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that arbitrators can
dispose of legal issues on dispositive motions); Reinglass v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No.
86407, 2006 WL 802751, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006) (upholding arbitrators’ dismissal of
arbitration claim because the investor failed to plead fraud with the specificity required by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
131

See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.

132 Both these opinions relate to tangential issues. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S.
299 (1985), deals with the in pari delicto defense. Id. at 306. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) deals with preclusion under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act. Id. at 1514. The paucity of case law is attributable, in large part, to Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See supra note 14.
133

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
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address policy reasons for restricting the applicability of private remedies that relate
directly to customer-broker suits. First, the Court alluded to the dangers of
“extensive liability for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the
secondary market. It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical, for those
engaged in casual communications not to omit some fact that would, if included,
qualify the accuracy of a statement.”134 This concern echoes that of state courts that
impose liability for negligent misrepresentations only if a “special relationship” exists;
such a relationship is present when a customer has a relationship of trust and
confidence with his broker so that reliance on his statements is warranted.135 More
fundamentally, however, the reason to impose liability on brokers for negligent
misrepresentations is to curb any tendency brokers may have to treat their
responsibilities to convey information and recommendations casually. If this results
in brokers providing less casual advice to their customers, such an effect could be
positive and may lead investors to seek better, more informed advice. Second, in
interpreting SA section 12(a)(2), the Gustafson majority found it worrisome that
liability could be imposed without a showing that plaintiff relied on the negligent
misstatement.136 To establish liability under the proposed standards, however, the
customer would have the traditional burden of establishing reasonable reliance. A
related concern expressed by the Court in both Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder—the
dangers of expanding the class of plaintiffs to include those who were not in privity
with the maker of the statements137—is also not present in customer-broker cases.
Customer-broker relationships are agency relationships, and, in another line
of cases, the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to limit the scope of Rule 10b-5
claims so that they do not intrude into areas more appropriately regulated under state
law. In the Court’s view, some purported Rule 10b-5 claims, properly viewed, do
not raise federal securities disclosure issues. Rather, these claims are transparent
attempts to convert state law mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty claims into
134 Id. at 578. Indeed, this concern relates more directly to the customer-broker situation than it does
to the facts in Gustafson, which involved alleged misrepresentations contained in the contract
negotiated between the controlling shareholder and the purchaser of its shares. Id. at 564.
135

See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578.

The following language is found in both opinions: “[W]e are not the first court to express concern
that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of law will ultimately
result in more harm than good.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747-48 (1975).
137
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federal claims that are “‘at best a subsidiary purpose’ of the federal legislation.”138
Amending the SEA to create a federal remedy for negligent broker conduct,
however, is consistent with an important purpose of the federal securities laws from
their inception—to improve professional standards of broker-dealers.139 While
creation of this federal remedy would, to some extent, overlap with state law, it
would not interfere with state regulation. In light of increased investor participation
in the securities markets and greater recognition of the importance of individuals
investing for their retirement, the participation of the federal courts in interpreting
and applying federal standards of competence and care would serve a vital national
interest.
Another concern expressed by the Supreme Court is the increased cost of
doing business resulting from vexatious litigation. More specifically, the Court is
concerned about the effects of class action suits where the plaintiffs have purchased
or sold securities during a period when material misrepresentations allegedly
distorted the stock price. 140 In class actions, the stakes of individual plaintiffs are
small, and the driving force may be the lure of lucrative fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys;
hence, there is some reason for the Court to be skeptical of both the compensatory
benefit to investors and the deterrence value of the litigation.141 However, the
Court’s general fear of strike suits has no relevance when the real party in interest is
the customer who is seeking compensation for losses suffered through the broker’s
negligence. In addition, the Court’s concern for protecting professionals who have a
peripheral role in the plaintiffs’ loss142 is not relevant here.
It is true, more generally, that imposing liability on brokers for negligence
will increase the costs of doing business on an already highly regulated industry.
Since the large publicly-traded brokerage firms consistently report large profits,143
138

Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).

139

See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1994);
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740.

140

The latter was the principal reason the Supreme Court initially implied causes of action in federal
securities laws. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
141

142

Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188-189.

See Susanne Craig, Bear Stearns Profit Surges 81%, Driven by Bond and Stock Trading, WALL ST. J., June
16, 2006, at C3; Randall Smith, Morgan Stanley, Mack See Net Soar, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at C4;
Press Release, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch Reports Highest-Ever Net Revenues of $8.0
143
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requiring them to invest more money in better training and supervision of their
brokers would not be an excessive hardship, especially given the anticipated benefits
to investors. To the extent that federal standards may drive out of the industry firms
with fewer resources to devote to training and supervision, this is not an undesirable
result. Moreover, there is reason to doubt that self-regulation gives investors
adequate protection. Unfortunately, recent history provides numerous instances of
both the SEC and the SROs’ inability to protect investors even from outright fraud
and other serious abuses of investor confidence.144 In addition, self-regulation is
certain to change as a result of both the NYSE and NASD becoming publicly
owned, for-profit corporations. Thoughtful commentators have expressed concerns
about whether enforcement of the SRO rules will be a priority in this environment.145
Furthermore, the valid concern expressed about non-frivolous Rule 10b-5
litigation—that former shareholders of the issuer will recover at the expense of
current shareholders146—is not present in customer/broker cases, unless we extend
the “robbing Peter to pay Paul” concern to apply to shareholders of a brokerage
firm, who presumably understand the risks of the company’s business when they
make their investment.147 To the extent factoring in the financial impact on firms’
accounting for their investors’ losses is a valid concern, it may be alleviated if
Billion for First Quarter 2006, Up 28 Percent (Apr. 18,
http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_8149_63464_65577_65830.

2006),

available

at

See generally One Broker Gone Bad: Punishing the Criminal, Making Victims Whole: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2002)
(chronicling the massive fraud conducted by Frank Gruttadauria, a broker employed by three
securities firms over the course of 15 years, during which he stole at least $40 million of customers’
funds before turning himself in), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/10771.pdf.
144

145 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock
and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 424 (2002); Edmund W. Kitch, Hard Thinking About
Inevitable Developments?, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 37, 44 (2000).
146 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262-63 (1988) (White, J., dissenting). There has been
much scholarly commentary on the problem of damages in securities class actions. See, e.g., JAMES D.
COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 727-28 (5th ed. 2006).

The SEC recently formulated a policy on corporate penalties in response to similar concerns. See
Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/20064.htm.
147
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Congress enacts federal standards in the current climate, when the nation is now
sufficiently far removed from the recent market debacle that constructive and
dispassionate debate can result in a consensus regarding appropriate standards.
Lower federal courts have expressed other policy reasons against customers’
suits against negligent brokers. Even prior to the Supreme Court era that cut back
on federal jurisdiction, the Second Circuit expressed hostility toward “saddl[ing]” the
federal courts with “garden-variety customer-broker suits.”148 It is unclear whether
this statement reflects merely a concern for docket control or whether it signifies a
more substantive view that these issues are better left to state law. The nearly
universal presence of arbitration agreements in broker-customer contracts today
cures the first objection, and the importance of individual investors in today’s society
makes the customer-broker relationship a federal concern.
Other courts believed that it would be unfair to subject a broker who acted
in good faith to judicial review of his market judgment.149 However, in determining
whether the broker satisfied his duty under the first six standards set forth above, the
issue is whether he lived up to his duty of care, a familiar judicial inquiry under tort
law. A broker’s market judgment would be an issue for judicial review under the
seventh standard, and because of the paucity of judicial precedents on this issue, this
Article does not advocate for its adoption. However, it should be noted that
assessing the soundness of market judgment is a question that securities arbitration is
uniquely qualified to perform. In arbitration, there is no jury that might be prone
toward undue sympathy for the customer or hostility toward the brokerage firm. and,
on a typical three-person arbitration panel, one of the arbitrators is an industry
arbitrator for the purpose of bringing industry expertise to bear on appropriate
professional standards.
Finally, another category of objections focuses on the plaintiff-customer and
finds him insufficiently worthy. Concern is expressed that greedy customers who
were willing to gamble may now be trying to blackmail the firm into paying for losses
the customers willingly incurred.150 These are valid concerns, but they are not unique
148

Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1966).

149 See e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev’d on other grounds,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
150 This sentiment is not new. In the debate on the SEA, one Congressman stated: “I also recognize
another man who is very largely responsible for the misfortunes of the country and the excessive
stock speculation and debacle. That is Mr. American Citizen who wants to get something for
nothing.” 78 CONG. REC. 7861, 7862 (1934) (statement of Rep. Lea), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 853 (1983); see also Robert H. Mundheim,
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to these tort claims. Contributory negligence, justifiable reliance and similar defenses
are available to minimize or, in appropriate cases, eliminate recovery altogether.
Arbitration, with its emphasis on the facts of each particular case, is an especially
good forum to resolve these disputes. While arbitration is sometimes derided for its
“splitting the baby” approach, such a compromise is appropriate when contributory
negligence issues are significant.
CONCLUSION
Since 1934, Congress has amended the SEA on several occasions to improve
professionalism in the selling of securities. What is missing, however, is a federal
remedy for investors to hold their brokers accountable for negligent conduct in
trading transactions, particularly negligent advice-giving. It is now time that
Congress adopts federal standards of competence and care and provides customers
with a remedy that will allow recovery for the financial harm caused by incompetent
or careless brokers. Toward that end, this Article proposes a number of federal
standards of care and competence for consideration. Legislative consideration of
this proposal should, at the least, engender a robust public debate over what
customers can reasonably expect from their brokers that hopefully will lead to a
remedy to vindicate their rights.

Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 463-64 (1965)
(discussing concerns that imposing civil liability for violations of industry standards “would be an
invitation for disappointed customers to blackmail their broker-dealers”).

